The paper provides freedom measures for game theoretic settings. The measures solve the problem of measuring freedom in situations where agents interact. To illustrate the measure, example models of discrimination and optimal taxation are examined.
We propose a behavioral theory of preference for decision rights, driven by preference for freedom, power, or non-interference. We conduct a novel laboratory experiment in which the effect of each preference can be disentangled. We find evidence that the intrinsic value of decision rights is driven more strongly by preference for non-interference than by preference for freedom or power.
This paper starts from the observation that in public-goods group contests, group impact can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual efforts. We use a CES-impact function to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of such a contest.
This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with homogeneous valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups.